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1Problem Setting
Traditionally, the problem of manufacturing has been understood in
terms of a narrow range of technical indicators: economies of scale,
production cost, scheduling, factory lay-outs, inventory management, and
so on. While each of these indicators may constitute an important part
in the business school curriculum as well as day-to-day factory
operations, technical knowledge alone does not lead to an insightful
understanding as to what the present-day manufacturing is all about.
Even if the problem of manufacturing is discussed in broader academic
terms, it still tends to be looked at in the light of a simplistic facet
such as labour process control, transaction cost, culture or technology.
I argue instead that the current successes or crises of
manufacturing activity in industrial societies can be fully understood
only when they are placed in the context of historical evolution through
which various institutions in each society have emerged and disappeared.
I argue further that when a structural mismatch between existing
institutions and changing externalities develops in a society, its
viability is at stake.
History has shown us numerous examples of once dominant industrial
powers being superceded by new entrants. When we look closer at them,
we invariably find institutional rigidities being irrevocably developed
in defeated models. The current crises of many industrial societies may
thus be understood as organizational impotence to change.
I claim, more specifically, that the characteristics of the final
product market define production organization. Should the former
change, the latter must also adapt to that change. If there persists a
mismatch between the market and production organization in a firm or an
2economy, the viability of the firm or the economy itself is at stake.
This is what we see today in many firms or economies in the industrial
world. Their current crises are structurally defined.
Galbraith's once popular claim (1972) that the market can be
controlled by large firms' demand management, particularly by the art of
advertisement working on 'the mass' (p.213), has lost its ground. This
is because phenomena from the last two decades or so have turned the
concept of the mass itself dubious. Large industrial corporations, once
hailed as 'accomplishments themselves', have been found utterly impotent
in the face of the emergence of the 'micromasses' -- defined by Fujioka
(1986) as relatively small social groupings with unique but internally
uniform purchasing patterns. Affluence in advanced societies has
disaggregated the final product market to the degree that
characteristics of large-firm industrial systems -- such as large-scale
technology, dedicated manpower, planning and long lead times -- can in
fact be counterproductive. Many firms which have continued to rely on
the Galbraithian prescription of demand management and advertisement
manipulation alone have been in crisis. Their plight is not so much due
to the failure of their marketing techniques as to the lack of
structural adaptation of their production organization to external
change. Tendencies towards volatile, fragmented markets have been
increasingly requiring flexible productive responses. Today,
manufacturers must provide large variety in small volumes in much
shorter lead times and product cycles than in the past. Only those who
have understood this and altered their production organization to this
end can survive competition successfully.
3Having thus set out a larger context in which manufacturing
activity takes place today, I now proceed to my central question: the
evolution of Japanese subcontracting. This issue is specifically
selected because it not only exemplifies an evolutionary adaptation to
ever-changing environments but also represents a successful model that
has responded well to the present-day disaggregation of the final
product market, while retaining competition, innovation and flexibility.
As will be demonstrated, my evolutionary approach t-o the problem
covers what other paradigms have missed -- be they dualism (Edwards,
1979; Berger & Piore, 1980), cultural preferences (Dore, 1987),
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) or flexible specialization
(Piore & Sabel, 1984).
Furthermore, results of my international research suggest that the
evolution of Japanese subcontracting is not so specific a problem to
Japan as is generally thought. Rather, it entails a range of universal
issues relevant to all industrial societies today, once looked at as an
alternative organizational response to changing environments.
In what follows, I will provide a brief review and critique of the
four major arguments -- which I have just mentioned -- pertinent to my
inquiry: dualism, transaction cost economics, cultural preferences and
flexible specialization. Then, I will give a summary of my alternative
evolutionary account induced from historical evidence from Japan.
First, there are familiar arguments of dualism (Berger & Piore,
1980, and many others). Large firms utilize small subcontractors as a
buffer against fluctuations in demand. When the economy contracts, the
former internalize outside operations so as to protect their own
business and regular workers at the cost of subcontractors. Cheap
4labour and lack of unionization in the latter sustain the system. There
always remains unequal treatment of economic agents in different sectors
of the economy irrespective of their objective worth. A radical twist
of this dualist approach (Edwards, 1979) claims that managers of large
firms exploit subcontractors so as to fracture the working class; that
opportunities to exploit advanced technology are limited to large firms;
and that there will be a decline of the small, peripheral sector due to
large firms' spillover into new markets and new industries.
Evidence from Japan indicates, however, that, while the 'shock
absorber' elements of subcontracting can by no means be negated, parts
of the above argument are not tenable. Small firms have not declined.
They continue to account for more than two-thirds of the working
population and one-third of the total industrial value added (Figure 1).
The availability of advanced technology has not been restricted to large
firms. The diffusion of microchip technology as exemplified by
numerically controlled (NC) machines has narrowed the gap between large
and small firms. Interscale wage differentials have substantially
narrowed to the international average as well (Figure 2), making it less
attractive to use subcontractors for cheap labour reasons alone.
Subcontractors were not indiscriminately forced out of business even
during the hardest recessions. The dualist account provides little
analytical leverage for these facts. There must be extra-dualist
factors to be taken into account.
The second argument of transaction cost economics (Williamson,
1985) claims that, due to human nature's proclivity to opportunism and
bounded rationality, recourse to hierarchies or vertical integration is
an appropriate measure to foreclose market failure and to economize on
5transaction costs. This being so, the only major reason for the
continuation of obligational contracting is asset specificity, defined
as durable investments in support of specific transactions. Without
asset specificity, however, there is no logic for continuous contracting
relations which are prone to be dysfunctional. This view, however,
simply reiterates what is observable ex post. It does not explicate wby
in the first place such risky investments of a durable kind should be
made by, allegedly, intrinsically opportunistic economic agents. Nor
does it provide sufficient evidence to support the claimed
dysfunctionality of obligational contracting.
The third argument of cultural preferences (Dore, 1987) proposes
that it is a Japanese trait of a non-opportunistic kind -- their
predisposition to goodwill and benevolence -- that accounts for the
prevalence of relational contracting in Japan, and that it is this
cultural quality that explains moralized trading relationships and lower
degrees of transaction costs and opportunism in Japan. There are four
concomitants: collective risk-sharing and long-term advantage;
dutifulness, in that benevolence is perceived and performed as a duty;
friendliness, because of Japanese predisposition to shun adverse
bargaining relationships; and economic efficiency of a non-allocative
kind that compensates for price distortion. A more popular version of
such a cultural view (particularly strong in Europe) holds that the
inclination of the Japanese to accept a greater degree of obedience to a
superior power has resulted in strikingly pervasive and hierarchical
subcontracting structures.
Interesting as these claims may be, historical evidence shows that
subcontracting was not an essential part of the Japanese economy earlier
6in the twentieth century. It was only after the explosion of munitions
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demand concomitant with the progress of the Manchurian Incident, the
Sino-Japan Incident and World War II that subcontracting for the first
time emerged -- promoted by the state -- as a prominent part of the
wartime economy. It then largely disappeared with the end of World War
II. It took the Korean War economic boom to see the resurgence of
subcontracting, and dualism at large, in Japan. Although the
predisposition of the Japanese may or may not have played a nontrivial
role in the diffusion of subcontracting, there is no convincing evidence
which suggests that it is so powerful as to constitute a consistent
prerequisite regardless of context. It seems to me imperative, then,
that the issue should be examined in broader socioeconomic and
historical perspectives.
The fourth argument of flexible specialization (Piore & Sabel,
1984) provides a larger view: mass production principles and
technologies based on special-purpose, product-specific machines and
semi-skilled labour to produce standardized goods are crumbling, because
they have lost their adaptability to external change. Instead,
'flexible specialization' should provide a viable alternative -- which
is derived from the once-lost craft mode of production and which draws
on skilled workers using general-purpose machinery flexibly to turn out
goods for shifting markets. Thus, there are two crises for the
international economy today: a mismatch between existing regulatory
institutions and their ability to connect production and consumption,
and the choice of the technology itself. What is increasingly
observable in industrial societies is the emergence of a new industrial
order, as exemplified by the 'Third Italy' and other regions in Europe,
7in which there is the reversal of roles between small and large firms,
the former with the might of flexible specialization upturning the
latter's traditional superiority.
This argument directly addresses an important question concerning
linkages between the final product market and production methods and
draws our attention to the fact that adaptation takes place in a macro
socioeconomic context. It further emphasizes that the deliberate choice
of production technology is the key to relaunch growth in advanced
economies. Their argumentative plane is thus broader than the
aforementioned approaches and deserves close examination.
However, evidence from Japan, again, may cast doubt on the
sustainability of the claimed reversal of roles between small and large
firms. If we ask whether high volume producers such as Toyota, Nissan
and Hitachi are breaking up due to the emergence of flexibly specialized
small businesses, the answer is clearly no. Moreover, the dichotomous
characterization of mass production vs. flexible specialization
principles and/or methods does not stand up to careful empirical
examination, which suggests that these two models are in fact often
usefully combined as a pragmatic corporate response to shifting markets.
Traditional accounts thus told, let me now turn to a summary of the
major findings of my research. This summary itself constitutes a self-
explanatory refutation of the existing paradigms and proposes an
alternative evolutionary account.
Major Findings and Arguments
Gradually in the 1960s and decisively after the mid-1970s,
tendencies towards the fragmentation of final product markets in Japan
8-- concomitant with her rapid arrival at affluence and fierce interfirm
competition -- necessitated a fundamental productive adaptation: from
mass production to 'post-commodity' production (a term I will explicate
below). While such adaptation may or may not be equally observed in
other industrial societies, Japanese historical specificity produced
some intriguing consequences. Traditional subcontracting institutions
-- originally developed as a temporary measure in the dualistic context
-- began to assume a new, long-term role for organizing various
manufacturing units to provide large variety in small volumes in the
final market. Extensive conversion of the existing mechanisms to this
end took place. And this change crucially influenced the subsequent
evolution of Japanese subcontracting. I shall come back to this point
shortly.
'Post-commodity' production can be defined as a productive response
to a final market situation where, due to saturation and diminished
marginal utility, commodities are no longer marketable without useful
product differentiation. The advantage of product differentiation can
be maintained only when a product is provided for the market in limited
quantities for a relatively short period. Commodities -- or
standardized goods as in the traditional mass market -- are thus
fractured, assuming new essential attributes of variety and volatility.
Massive investments in facilities for a long production run of a single
product, suitable for a stable mass market, are now replaced by
intelligent investments on smaller manufacturing units -- often
involving subcontractors -- that are better suited for flexible
production of large variety in small volumes. Evidence indicates,
however, that this shift neither points to the end of mass production
9nor a return to the craft mode of production. Rather, what we see today
in competitive firms or economies is a pragmatic synthesis of the two, a
third form of production organization which combines the principles of
repetitive manufacturing with the elements of flexible specialization in
adaptation to the rise of the post-commodity markets.
As stated, Japanese subcontracting systems -- historically
generated from wartime political needs and dualistic infrastructure of
Japanese economy -- went through a marked evolution after.the 1960s --
although it did not happen overnight. The original purpose of Japanese
manufacturers during the period of postwar growth (and in this regard
during the period of World War II as well) may have been an attempt to
imitate American mass production. But they had no luxury of having the
same mass markets as in the U.S. What they had, instead, was much
smaller domestic markets where competition was fiercely fought amongst
many producers. Capacity problems in the booming economy after the
Korean War (through to the early 1960s) were resolved by resorting to
subcontractors and temporary workers. The resurgence of postwar dualism
after the mid-1950s helped this. A historical irony, however, is that
what seemed like a temporary arrangement turned out to become almost a
permanent characteristic of the Japanese economy.
On the one hand, Japanese prime contractors invested heavily on
their own mass production facilities from the late 1950s onwards. On
the other hand, in order to manage increasing variety in small volumes
and retain market share, and yet to maintain flexibility, they began to
delegate their small-lot assembly and subassembly operations -- and not
merely partial machining or surface treatment - - to outside
manufacturers. Having seen the viability of this strategy, they then
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started to transfer their internal operations on a larger scale intact
to external manufacturing units. Contract assembly and, further,
contract product development came increasingly to play an important role
in subcontracting relations. (For a long-term trend of this, see Fuji
Electric's case in Table 1.)
In the automotive industry, for example, contract assembly of
small-lot, specialty motor vehicles (e.g., sports cars, special-purpose
vans) by auto body suppliers for volume-oriented assemblers such as
Toyota and Nissan, became an essential feature of their production
organizations. (For Toyota's contract assembly, see Table 2.)
Furthermore, contract development of these specialty products also came
to be undertaken by contract assemblers. Components fabrication and
subassembly went through a similar organizational evolution. Components
suppliers were increasingly assigned responsibilities for the
development and manufacture of systems components.
In the electrical appliances and electronics industries, change was
more dramatic. A typical television set factory in the late 1950s, for
example, had long assembly lines staffed with many female assembly
workers at the prime contractor (Figure 3). Over time, however, the
assembly lines and workers largely disappeared from the prime
contractor. They were found instead in much smaller units elsewhere;
the main firm's subsidiaries and subcontractors were turned into
contract assemblers, each responsible for a narrow and specialized range
of models. By contrast, the prime contractor's own factory, with more
engineers but fewer workers, now focused on product development, process
innovation and production of highly value-added or state-of-the-art
products (Figure 4). The general rule was that, when new products were
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developed and all the teething problems with early production lots and
new processes were resolved on the in-house experimental line (or were
'dried out' as the industry terminology says), the actual assembly,
testing, packaging and shipping operations tended to be transferred to
contract assemblers. The domain of production operations that the prime
contractor retained in-house was for strategic products entailing
expertise of a highly proprietary kind or for genuinely mass produced
items which yielded straightforward economies of scale. Clear division
of labour and 'locked-in' subcontracting relations emerged. Since
contract assemblers (and to a lesser extent systems components
suppliers) were by definition concerned with customer specific products,
contract specific investments naturally spread and became a high
proportion of assets. Consequently, subcontracting relations became
more long-term and symbiotic.
This new system relieved the prime contractor from managing a large
part of increasingly complex operational and administrative tasks
concomitant with its rapid growth. The firm could allocate its internal
resources to more strategic use including, as mentioned above, product
development, process innovation and state-of-the-art manufacturing. The
system also allowed the firm to proliferate its product lines without
incurring the level of costs involved in all in-house operations. The
simultaneous diffusion of various development and production activities
to external units shortened lead times and product cycles on the whole.
This greatly helped the prime contractor adjust to shifting demands and
get ahead of the competition, all the while maintaining overall
flexibility.
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One extreme example which illustrates the magnitude of contract
assembly is that by the mid-1980s there remained only one monochrome
television set manufacturer in Japan which exclusively contract-
assembled for about ten customers under their brand names without
producing any of its own!(l)
One significant consequence of the foregoing is that, over time,
reasons for subcontracting became more varied than at the outset.
Contract assembly and systems components manufacture obviously required
higher technical capabilities of a coordinating kind than simple
machining, surface treatment or 'preforming'. Therefore, the overall
technical capabilities of subcontractors, in addition to price and other
indicators of performance, came to be systematically monitored by the
prime contractor. Periodic checking made those with inferior
capabilities obliged to become second- or lower-tier subcontractors --
or otherwise to change or go out of their business. Here, elements of
dualism persisted. Periodic checking, however, also institutionalized
inter-tier mobilities. Those with good records were promoted to a
better tier status or expanded business. A well-defined tiering
structure based on all-round performance and capabilities was thus
brought into subcontracting mechanisms.
Furthermore, the above changes in subcontracting mechanisms
entailed unexpected effects. They fostered entrepreneurship and
innovation, placed the right technology in the right place, diffused
transaction costs, promoted group loyalty and information sharing,
stimulated competition while keeping it coordinated, and changed the
function of the prime contractor's purchasing organization. Further,
9
(1) Interview with Professor M. Ikeda of Chuo University, spring 1986.
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they even spread the wealth in society at large and promoted more
progressive human relations. All these effects were embedded in the
mechanisms of the new subcontracting systems. Let me explain these in
seriatim.
It was in the interest of subcontractors to innovate. Their newly
defined enriched status stirred their entrepreneurship. The more they
innovated, the greater the chance for growth and profitability. As
'locked in' subcontracting spread, their proposals for new methods,
components and products or for improvements on existing ones came to be
regularly encouraged and monitored by their customers. Those with good
records became preferentially treated and expanded their business in the
long run. Over time, fair profit-sharing rules became established for
such innovations.
In this process, subcontractors came to find their own niches in
the choice of technologies. Unlike Galbraith's (and to some extent
Edwards') predictions, not all technologies became large-scale,
technocratic and expensive even in the most advanced industries. There
always remained a domain of production activities better performed by
simple technologies in which smaller firms excelled. Drawing on
Galbraith's example of superhighway construction (1972:42), it is
unrealistic to assume that every construction activity can be performed
by bulldozers and heavy earth-moving equipment. There always are tasks
suitable for picks and shovels -- i.e., inexpensive, highly mobile &
redeployable, general-purpose tools readily available from the market.
Would not small subcontractors with scant capital have incentives to
resort to and specialize in such simple tools?
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In the world of the post-commodity market where frequent design
changes, small quantities per product line, shortened lead times and
product cycles are the norm, some recourse to picks and shovels may turn
out to be far better than an exclusive reliance on an array of
bulldozers and heavy equipment -- depending of course on purposes and
applications. Furthermore, if the simple technology were usefully
combined with the large-scale, complex technology -- which has its own
place in large firms, the end result would be far more viable in a world
of increasing uncertainty than single-minded devotion to one technology.
This is exactly what the new subcontracting systems in Japan have
achieved.
It was the responsibility of first-tier suppliers and
subcontractors to coordinate second-tier subcontractors, for the latter
to coordinate third-tier subcontractors, and so on. In general, the
lower the tier, the smaller the size of firm and the simpler the
technology employed. In this system, control and coordination functions
were hierarchically delegated through these semi-autonomous tiering
clusters. Such mechanisms may be called 'hierarchical cluster control'
in contrast with 'arms length control'. Transaction costs for the prime
contractor were thus gradationally transferred to its external partners.
With prime contractors on top, many first-tier suppliers and
subcontractors below cross-serving multiple customers, and far many more
lower-tier subcontractors occupying the lower niches, the whole
subcontracting structure resembled a range of pyramids or mountains
overlapping one another. Hence, the 'Alps' structure which yields --
with its semi-autonomous manufacturing constituents - - organizational
flexibility as a whole (Figures 5 & 6). 4
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The fine-tuned division of labour amongst subcontractors and their
relatively stable memberships within 'clusters' promoted group loyalty.
They were organized into a subcontractors' association under a single
customer, which fostered information sharing. Serving other customers
with a varying degree of dependence helped these subcontractors maintain
their bargaining power too. Organized competition was also brought in
through periodic checking on subcontractors' performance and
preferential treatment of better performers. The key function of the
prime contractor's purchasing organization shifted from cost haggling to
coordinating, checking and fostering subcontractors. The attention to
human relations was promoted in this process. Lastly, a more pervasive
spread of the wealth in society at large was brought about. In the
interest of symbiosis, large firms did not crush small firms. They used
them, and vice versa. The end result was a fairly synergistic economy,
with multiple players flexibly adjusting to changing externalities
without sacrificing control, freedom, autonomy, competition, trust,
innovation and entrepreneurship.
Government policy -- which was promoted by a desire of the
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to secure electoral constituencies
-- to support small businesses and to ameliorate unfair treatment of
subcontractors, helped the above mechanisms sustain and reinforce
themselves. Government-backed small business financing organizations
and the institution of small business cooperatives provided
infrastructure for the survival and continuation of small firms and
subcontractors -- a large part of which might have otherwise
disappeared.
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The marked prevalence and prosperity of subcontracting in Japan can
thus be understood as an evolutionary product of a complex interaction
amongst historical, socioeconomic, organizational, technological and
political factors. The foregoing review of my study suggests that
mechanisms of the present Japanese subcontracting systems cannot be
meaningfully analyzed in terms of dualism, bargaining relations,
technology or culture alone.
How specific, then, is the Japanese experience? The last several
decades have seen a remarkable diffusion of Japanese products all over
the world. The general image of Japanese products as 'cheap and bad'
has turned into 'high quality'. Simultaneously, the competitiveness and
flexibility of Japanese production organizations have become an object
of international attention. Given this, do tendencies towards the post-
commodity markets - - which appear to be prevalent amongst advanced
economies -- also indicate that non-Japanese competitors can benefit
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from adopting Japanese production organization? More specifically, are
Japanese subcontracting institutions -- a curious product of the
idiosyncratic trajectory of Japanese capitalism and common properties of
capitalism in general -- transferable to other industrial societies?
Does it make sense to do so? Do competitors want to do that? Or do
they have their own solutions and alternatives?
These are both hypothetical and empirical questions. As yet, they
are open questions too. Recent evidence on international encounters in
the automotive industry -- through the increasing number of joint
ventures and 'transplants' -- indicates that the answer to these
questions is probably yes -- with qualifications, however.
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Across industrial societies there are of course substantial
differences in unionization, the degree of dualism, subcontracting
institutions, government policy on small businesses, availability of
technologies, and other infrastructural factors. To be sure, these
differences seriously affect, circumscribe or promote cross-
fertilization. Moreover, the constitution of capitalism itself -- be it
neocorporatist, 'statist' or 'laissez-fairist' -- critically defines the
viability of subcontracting institutions.
Given these qualifications, however, results from my international
field research on automotive components supply indicate that adaptations
to the hierarchical cluster control model, with its purposively
redefined division of labour moving away from arms length relationships,
are -- or are going to be -- fairly widespread. (For example, compare
Fuji Electric with Daimler-Benz in Figures 7 & 8.) Even if
manufacturers are not currently achieving all the desired results, they
are striving for them. These observable tendencies suggest that, once
stripped of idiosyncratic attributes and cultural myths, so-called
Japanese production and subcontracting organizations may indeed
represent a fairly universal response to changing environments that
industrial societies face today.
In this connection, Kenny and Florida (1988:147) note:
[Japan] currently stands at the center of a far-reaching process
of technological and economic restructuring that will affect both
the future trajectory of the international economy and the
position of nation-states within it as well as the role and well-
being of workers in yet another phase of capitalist development.
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Or, perhaps, it is too early to claim such a thing, while too late
to discuss the subject matter merely in terms of narrow analytical
theories such as dualism, transaction cost economics, and the like.(2)
9
(2) Professor Charles F. Sabel of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology once commented in private communication: 'It is too late to
write off dualism, but too early to write on a new system'.
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BREAKDOWNS OF SUBCONTRACTING AT FUJI ELECTRIC'S
(1965-90)
(Percentage/Value Based)
Processes* Subassembly** Finished Products
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28 27
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Electric's Tokyo Plant, 1986.
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Table 2.
TOYOTA'S CONTRACT ASSEMBLY (1987)
Cars
(incl. Vans)
Century
Crown
Mark II
Chaser
Cresta
Camry
Vista
Corona
Carina
Celica
Soarer
Supra
Corolla
Sprinter
Tercel/Corsa
Caribu
Starlet
Publica P/U
MR2
TMC
Assemblers
TAL TAB KAW Cen HENM Dai AAB GAB
Csh
Cshvw
C
C
Cscl
Ch
C
C
C
Cscw2 Cl
Cl
C35
C
C
C
C
Csvw
Csh
C
C
Csvwr5
Cs
Csc
Csc
Cs
Cvwr5
Csvw
C345
C
Mini Vans
Hi Ace C
Town/Master Ace C C
Lite Ace C
Trucks
Dyna 2t F CB CB CB
Toyo Ace 1.5t F CB
Hi Ace F CB CB
Town/Lite Ace F CB
Hi Lux Cpm Cp
Land Cruiser F CB
Big Truck F CB
Blizzard C
Stout F CB
Coaster F CB
C: Complete Assembly. F: Final Assembly. CB: Cab Assembly.
TMC: Toyota Motor Corp. TAL: Toyoda Automatic Loom Works.
TAB: Toyota Auto Body. KAW: Kanto Auto Works. Cen: Central
Car. HNM: Hino Motors. Dai: Daihatsu Motors. AAB: Arakawa
Auto Body. GAB: Gifu Auto Body.
s: sedan. h: hardtop. c: coupe. v: van. w: station wagon. 1:
liftback. p: pickup. m: multi-purpose. 345: no. of doors.
r: rear wheel drive.
Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, 1987.
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